[OE-core] [PATCH 3/3] unzip: fix CVE-2019-13232
Khem Raj
raj.khem at gmail.com
Sat Jul 20 18:14:32 UTC 2019
This is causing issues in OE world build, unpacking zip SRC_URIs which
have been working well see
https://errors.yoctoproject.org/Errors/Build/84471/
https://errors.yoctoproject.org/Errors/Build/84470/
https://errors.yoctoproject.org/Errors/Build/84467/
Debian has the patch proposed here along with another patch but is
holding on to this since its causing regressions there as well.
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=932318
We should not apply this patch yet or revert it if its applied already
On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 6:32 PM Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal at intel.com> wrote:
>
> Include the fix by Mark Adler which has also been adopted by Debian.
>
> Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal at intel.com>
> ---
> .../unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232.patch | 339 ++++++++++++++++++
> meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 340 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..c808f3d36a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip/CVE-2019-13232.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
> +From: Mark Adler <madler at alumni.caltech.edu>
> +Subject: Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
> +Origin: https://github.com/madler/unzip/commit/47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c
> +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/931433
> +X-Debian-version: 6.0-24
> +
> + Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
> +
> + This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that
> + overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the
> + end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries
> + to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid
> + zip file is rejected.
> +
> + See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's
> + analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs.
> +
> + The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files
> + so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any
> + bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are
> + considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed
> + or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to
> + be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is
> + contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as
> + invalid.
> +
> + This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in
> + undefer_input() that misplaced the input state."
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Pending [Patch taken from debian]
> +CVE: CVE-2019-13232
> +Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal at intel.com>
> +
> +--- a/extract.c
> ++++ b/extract.c
> +@@ -321,6 +321,125 @@
> + "\nerror: unsupported extra-field compression type (%u)--skipping\n";
> + static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] =
> + "error [%s]: bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n";
> ++static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] =
> ++ "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n";
> ++static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] =
> ++ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n";
> ++
> ++
> ++
> ++
> ++
> ++/* A growable list of spans. */
> ++typedef zoff_t bound_t;
> ++typedef struct {
> ++ bound_t beg; /* start of the span */
> ++ bound_t end; /* one past the end of the span */
> ++} span_t;
> ++typedef struct {
> ++ span_t *span; /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of spans */
> ++ size_t num; /* number of spans in the list */
> ++ size_t max; /* allocated number of spans (num <= max) */
> ++} cover_t;
> ++
> ++/*
> ++ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val.
> ++ * If there is no such span, then cover->num is returned.
> ++ */
> ++static size_t cover_find(cover, val)
> ++ cover_t *cover;
> ++ bound_t val;
> ++{
> ++ size_t lo = 0, hi = cover->num;
> ++ while (lo < hi) {
> ++ size_t mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
> ++ if (val < cover->span[mid].beg)
> ++ hi = mid;
> ++ else
> ++ lo = mid + 1;
> ++ }
> ++ return hi;
> ++}
> ++
> ++/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */
> ++static int cover_within(cover, val)
> ++ cover_t *cover;
> ++ bound_t val;
> ++{
> ++ size_t pos = cover_find(cover, val);
> ++ return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end;
> ++}
> ++
> ++/*
> ++ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any
> ++ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg
> ++ * must be less than end.
> ++ *
> ++ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for
> ++ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any
> ++ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the
> ++ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to
> ++ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory
> ++ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned.
> ++ */
> ++static int cover_add(cover, beg, end)
> ++ cover_t *cover;
> ++ bound_t beg;
> ++ bound_t end;
> ++{
> ++ size_t pos;
> ++ int prec, foll;
> ++
> ++ if (beg >= end)
> ++ /* The new span is invalid. */
> ++ return -1;
> ++
> ++ /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it does not
> ++ overlap with any existing spans. */
> ++ pos = cover_find(cover, beg);
> ++ if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) ||
> ++ (pos < cover->num && end > cover->span[pos].beg))
> ++ return 1;
> ++
> ++ /* Check for adjacencies. */
> ++ prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end;
> ++ foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg;
> ++ if (prec && foll) {
> ++ /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans. Merge the
> ++ following span into the preceding span, and delete the following
> ++ span. */
> ++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end;
> ++ cover->num--;
> ++ memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1,
> ++ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
> ++ }
> ++ else if (prec)
> ++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span. Extend the end
> ++ of the preceding span. */
> ++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = end;
> ++ else if (foll)
> ++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span. Extend the
> ++ beginning of the following span. */
> ++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
> ++ else {
> ++ /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the following
> ++ spans. Assure that there is room and insert the span. */
> ++ if (cover->num == cover->max) {
> ++ size_t max = cover->max == 0 ? 16 : cover->max << 1;
> ++ span_t *span = realloc(cover->span, max * sizeof(span_t));
> ++ if (span == NULL)
> ++ return -2;
> ++ cover->span = span;
> ++ cover->max = max;
> ++ }
> ++ memmove(cover->span + pos + 1, cover->span + pos,
> ++ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t));
> ++ cover->num++;
> ++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg;
> ++ cover->span[pos].end = end;
> ++ }
> ++ return 0;
> ++}
> +
> +
> +
> +@@ -376,6 +495,29 @@
> + }
> + #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */
> +
> ++ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a
> ++ span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */
> ++ if (G.cover == NULL) {
> ++ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t));
> ++ if (G.cover == NULL) {
> ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
> ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
> ++ return PK_MEM;
> ++ }
> ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL;
> ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0;
> ++ }
> ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0;
> ++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 &&
> ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) ||
> ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover,
> ++ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory,
> ++ G.ziplen) != 0) {
> ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
> ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
> ++ return PK_MEM;
> ++ }
> ++
> + /*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> + The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di-
> + rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie at the
> +@@ -593,7 +735,8 @@
> + if (error > error_in_archive)
> + error_in_archive = error;
> + /* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break) */
> +- if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) {
> ++ if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC ||
> ++ error == PK_BOMB) {
> + /* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ... */
> + reached_end = FALSE;
> + /* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */
> +@@ -1062,6 +1205,11 @@
> +
> + /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */
> + request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes;
> ++ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) {
> ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
> ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
> ++ return PK_BOMB;
> ++ }
> + inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ;
> + bufstart = request - inbuf_offset;
> +
> +@@ -1602,6 +1750,18 @@
> + return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by user request */
> + }
> + #endif
> ++ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request,
> ++ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf));
> ++ if (error < 0) {
> ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
> ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover)));
> ++ return PK_MEM;
> ++ }
> ++ if (error != 0) {
> ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
> ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents)));
> ++ return PK_BOMB;
> ++ }
> + #ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */
> + UserStop();
> + #endif
> +@@ -2003,6 +2163,34 @@
> + }
> +
> + undefer_input(__G);
> ++
> ++ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) {
> ++ /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature
> ++ * ambiguity)
> ++ */
> ++# define SIG 0x08074b50
> ++# define LOW 0xffffffff
> ++ uch buf[12];
> ++ unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12);
> ++ ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf);
> ++ ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4);
> ++ ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */
> ++ if (crc == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
> ++ (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
> ++ (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
> ++ ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */
> ++ (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */
> ++ (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG
> ++ /* if not SIG, have signature */
> ++ )))))
> ++ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */
> ++ shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4);
> ++ if (G.zip64)
> ++ shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */
> ++ if (shy)
> ++ error = PK_ERR;
> ++ }
> ++
> + return error;
> +
> + } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */
> +--- a/globals.c
> ++++ b/globals.c
> +@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@
> + # if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS))
> + uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */
> + # endif
> ++ G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */
> + #endif
> +
> + uO.lflag=(-1);
> +--- a/globals.h
> ++++ b/globals.h
> +@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@
> + ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */
> + z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */
> +
> ++ int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */
> ++
> + int mem_mode;
> + uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */
> + ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */
> + int reported_backslash; /* extract.c static */
> + int disk_full;
> + int newfile;
> ++ void **cover; /* used in extract.c for bomb detection */
> +
> + int didCRlast; /* fileio static */
> + ulg numlines; /* fileio static: number of lines printed */
> +--- a/process.c
> ++++ b/process.c
> +@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@
> + }
> + #endif
> +
> ++ /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */
> ++ if (G.cover != NULL) {
> ++ free(*(G.cover));
> ++ free(G.cover);
> ++ G.cover = NULL;
> ++ }
> ++
> + } /* end function free_G_buffers() */
> +
> +
> +@@ -1913,6 +1920,8 @@
> + #define Z64FLGS 0xffff
> + #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff
> +
> ++ G.zip64 = FALSE;
> ++
> + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL)
> + return PK_COOL;
> +
> +@@ -2084,6 +2093,8 @@
> + (ZCONST char *)(offset + ef_buf), ULen);
> + G.unipath_filename[ULen] = '\0';
> + }
> ++
> ++ G.zip64 = TRUE;
> + }
> +
> + /* Skip this extra field block */
> +--- a/unzip.h
> ++++ b/unzip.h
> +@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@
> + #define PK_NOZIP 9 /* zipfile not found */
> + #define PK_PARAM 10 /* bad or illegal parameters specified */
> + #define PK_FIND 11 /* no files found */
> ++#define PK_BOMB 12 /* likely zip bomb */
> + #define PK_DISK 50 /* disk full */
> + #define PK_EOF 51 /* unexpected EOF */
> +
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
> index daba722722..1d18526ce2 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/unzip/unzip_6.0.bb
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/infozip/UnZip%206.x%20%28latest%29/UnZip%206.0/
> file://symlink.patch \
> file://0001-unzip-fix-CVE-2018-1000035.patch \
> file://CVE-2018-18384.patch \
> + file://CVE-2019-13232.patch \
> "
> UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
>
> --
> 2.20.1
>
> --
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